Personal profile: Alessia Russo
Alessia Russo
Courses
The course introduces basic concepts of the theory of contracts. It aims to explore how asymmetric information can generate welfare losses and how optimally designed rules can prevent them.
In the first part of the course, we analyze bilateral contracting situations with one-sided private information. In reality, these situations arise when a party (for example an employee) has private information about her ability to take on certain tasks (hidden information) or when a party (for example an employer) cannot control what the employee does (hidden action). For these situation, we plan to address the fundamental question: how could adequate incentives be structured?
In the second part of the course, we extend the basic framework to a multilateral setting in which the role of competition between parties having private information is also explicitly taken into account. This extension will allow us to study the optimal design of auctions, which are commonly used to buy and sell goods or services.
The course will cover the following topics:
• Bilateral contracting
• Screening
• Signaling
• Moral hazard
• Multilateral contracting
• Auctions
- Teacher: Alessia Russo
- Teacher: Martina Celidoni
- Teacher: Roberto Ganau
- Teacher: Andreas Menzel
- Teacher: Susanna Piccin
- Teacher: Alessia Russo
- Teacher: Elena Sapienza